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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 Byron Lee Sanchez appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury verdict 
finding him guilty of threatening a public servant, in violation of I.C. § 18-1353(1)(b).  
On appeal, Sanchez argues the district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss, 
claiming as he did below that I.C. § 18-1353(1)(b) is unconstitutionally overbroad on its 
face.  He also challenges a number of the district court’s evidentiary rulings and argues 
the alleged errors, even if individually harmless, cumulated to deprive him of a fair trial. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 In 2014, Gem County Deputy Prosecutor Erick Thomson prosecuted Sanchez for 
felony injury to a child.  (Tr., p.181, Ls.8-17, p.183, L.23 – p.184, L.2, p.185, L.15 – 
p.186, L.10, p.189, L.4 – p.190, L.17, p.191, L.18 – p.192, L.9; State’s Exhibit 3.)  
Sanchez pled guilty to the charge and was thereafter sentenced to a period of retained 
jurisdiction and, ultimately, prison.  (Tr., p.188, L.12 – p.189, L.3; State’s Exhibit 3.)  As 
a result of Sanchez’s conviction, the state initiated a proceeding under the Child 
Protection Act (CPA) to determine the placement of Sanchez’s children, and Mr. 
Thomson also represented the state in that proceeding.  (Tr., p.186, L.15 – p.187, L.15, 
p.189, L.4 – p.190, L.17, p.190, L.23 – p.191, L.17; State’s Exhibit 2.)  In October 2015, 
Sanchez initiated a post-conviction proceeding to challenge his injury to a child 
conviction, and Mr. Thomson’s office (though not Mr. Thomson, personally) represented 
the state in the post-conviction case. (Tr., p.187, L.16 – p.188, L.21, p.189, L.21 – p.190, 
L.17, p.192, L.10 – p.193, L.4; State’s Exhibit 4.) 
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 In September 2016, while still incarcerated on the felony injury to a child 
conviction, and while the CPA action and Sanchez’s post-conviction case were pending, 
Sanchez wrote Mr. Thomson the following letter and mailed it to him at the Gem County 
Prosecutor’s Office:   
Hello Erick, 
 
 I hope you and your’s are doing well and congradulations on the 
new addition to your family. 
 
 To business:  A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of 
justice …  This responsibility carries with it specific obligations to see that 
the defendant is accorded justice, that guilt is decided upon the basis of 
sufficient evidence and that precautions are taken to prevent and to rectify 
the conviction of innocent persons.  I.C.R. 3.8(g), (H). 
 
 I am about to put some things into motion that neither you or I can 
undo.  I don’t want to, but I absolutely will.  I would like to think that we 
are reasonable.  I consider myself a Christian.  Retribution does not 
restore.  Hurting others, (even when they deserve it) also injures me.  I 
seek mitigation.  I am coming to you from a position of Legal strength 
asking you to consider coming to the prison and talking privately. 
 
 I have operated transparently from the beginning.  I am willing to 
make a one time offer which must be acted upon very soon; otherwise I 
will be forced to do this the hard-way.  My chess pieces are ready to move, 
and moving.  Parties have been contacted who await instructions. 
 
 I seek an opportunity to show Idaho what mercy looks like. 
 
 My God desires mercy over judgement, but make no mistake, when 
left no options, He will execute vengence and wrath.  Mistakes have been 
made; let us mitigate them by having an honest private conversation and 
decide what action may be acceptable to all parties. 
 
 Me, sitting in prison, with my children in harm’s way, for a crime I 
didn’t commit, past my fixed time, is unacceptable.  I have four possible 
solutions to offer and all of them are more pleasant that what is about to 
happen.  Refuse, and what happens next is your doing. 
 




(State’s Exhibit 1 (verbatim); see also Tr., p.197, L.9 – p.199, L.2, p.200, L.21 – p.201, 
L.10, p.212, Ls.15-20, p.228, L.17 – p.229, L.2, p.276, Ls.17-24, p.289, Ls.1-3.) 
The state charged Sanchez with one count of “Threats Against Public Servants in 
Official Matters,” in violation of I.C. § 18-1353(1)(b), with an enhancement for having 
committed the crime on the grounds of a correctional facility, I.C. § 19-2520F.  (R., 
pp.59-60, 90-91.)  Sanchez filed two separate motions to dismiss the charge.  (R., pp.148-
50.)  In his first motion, Sanchez challenged I.C. § 18-1353(1)(b) as being both 
unconstitutionally overbroad and void for vagueness.  (R., pp.148, 152-60.)  In his second 
motion, he argued that the charging document was not legally sufficient to impart 
jurisdiction because it “fail[ed] to include the material element of ‘harm’ in the offense 
charged.”  (R., pp.149-50.)  After entertaining briefing and conducting a hearing (R., 
pp.152-60, 166-84, 204-05), the district court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order 
denying Sanchez’s motions to dismiss1 (R., pp. 209-22). 
The case proceeded to trial, at the conclusion of which the jury found Sanchez 
guilty as charged.  (R., pp.234-242, 276; Tr., p.355, L.22 – p.357, L.1.)  The district court 
entered judgment and imposed a unified sentence of five years, with four years fixed, to 
run consecutively to Sanchez’s sentence in the injury to a child case.  (R., pp.280-83.)  
Sanchez timely appealed.  (R., pp.284-86.)  
  
                                            
1 Although the court found in relation to Sanchez’s second motion to dismiss that the 
charging document was not jurisdictionally defective, it nevertheless “grant[ed] the State 
leave to amend so as to expressly include the element of ‘harm’” “to insure there [was] no 
room for misunderstanding.”  (R., pp.220-21.)  Consistent with the court’s order, the state 
filed a Second Amended Information specifically alleging that Sanchez “did threaten 





Sanchez states the issues on appeal as: 
 
I. Did the district court err by denying Mr. Sanchez’s motion to 
dismiss because I.C. § 18-1353(1)(b) is facially overbroad? 
 
II. Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting irrelevant 
evidence of Mr. Thomson’s reaction to Mr. Sanchez’s letter? 
 
III. Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting irrelevant 
and prejudicial evidence of Mr. Sanchez’s prior conviction for 
injury to a child? 
 
IV. Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting irrelevant 
evidence of Mr. Sanchez’s post-conviction petition? 
 
V. Did these errors in the aggregate deprive Mr. Sanchez of his right 
to a fair trial? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.7.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
1. Has Sanchez failed to show error in the district court’s determination that I.C. 
§ 18-1353(1)(b) is not unconstitutionally overbroad on its face? 
  
2. Has Sanchez failed to show the district court abused its discretion by admitting 
evidence of Mr. Thomson’s reaction upon reading Sanchez’s threatening letter? 
 
3. Has Sanchez failed to show the district court abused its discretion by admitting 
evidence of Sanchez’s prior injury to a child conviction? 
 
4. Has Sanchez failed to show the district court abused its discretion by admitting 
evidence of Sanchez’s post-conviction proceeding? 
 
5. Has Sanchez failed to show the cumulative error doctrine applies, much less that 








Sanchez Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Determination That I.C. § 18-
1353(1)(b) Is Not Unconstitutionally Overbroad On Its Face 
 
A. Introduction 
 Sanchez argues the district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss, claiming 
as he did below that I.C. § 18-1353(1)(b) prohibits a substantial amount of speech 
protected by the First Amendment and, as such, is unconstitutionally overbroad on its 
face.2  (Appellant’s brief, pp.8-15.)  Sanchez’s argument fails.  The district court correctly 
determined the statute does not regulate a substantial amount of constitutionally protected 
conduct in relation to its plainly legitimate sweep and, as such, is not facially overbroad.  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 Where the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the appellate court reviews 
the district court’s decision de novo.  State v. Rome, 160 Idaho 40, 42, 368 P.3d 660, 662 
(Ct. App. 2016) (citing State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 246 (1998); 
State v. Martin, 148 Idaho 31, 34, 218 P.3d 10, 13 (Ct. App. 2009)).  “The party attacking 
a statute on constitutional grounds bears the burden of proof and must overcome a strong 
presumption of validity.”  Id. (citing State v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 
131 (2003), abrogated on other grounds by Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313 (2013); 
State v. Cook, 146 Idaho 261, 262, 192 P.3d 1085, 1086 (Ct. App. 2008)); accord State v.
                                            
2 In denying Sanchez’s motions to dismiss, the district court also rejected Sanchez’s 
arguments that I.C. § 18-1353(1)(b) is unconstitutionally vague, both on its face and as 
applied to Sanchez’s conduct, and that the charging document was jurisdictionally 
defective.  (See R., pp.216-20.)  Sanchez has not challenged these rulings on appeal. 
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Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 418, 272 P.3d 382, 390 (2012); Korsen, 138 Idaho at 711, 69 
P.3d at 131.  “Appellate courts are obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute that 
upholds its constitutionality.”  Manzanares, 152 Idaho at 418, 272 P.3d at 390 (quoting 
Korsen, 138 Idaho at 711, 69 P.3d at 131). 
 
C. Idaho Code § 18-1353(1)(b) Is Not Unconstitutionally Overbroad On Its Face 
 
“‘The overbreadth doctrine is aimed at statutes which, though designed to prohibit 
legitimately regulated conduct, include within their prohibitions constitutionally protected 
freedoms.’”  Manzanares, 152 Idaho at 423, 272 P.3d at 395 (quoting Korsen, 138 Idaho 
at 713, 69 P.3d at 133).  Although facial attacks for overbreadth are not favored in the 
law, such challenges are allowed where, as here, the challenging party asserts that the 
statute in question impermissibly infringes upon speech or conduct protected by the First 
Amendment.  See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010); City of 
Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 (1999); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-
12 (1973); Manzanares, 152 Idaho at 423-24, 272 P.3d at 395-96; State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 
885, 893, 88 P.3d 704, 712 (2004).  The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that the 
overbreadth doctrine is “strong medicine” and should be applied “sparingly and only as a 
last resort.”  Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613.  Accordingly, even a statute that “inhibit[s] the 
exercise of First Amendment rights” will be invalidated as facially overbroad only “if the 
impermissible applications of the law are substantial when ‘judged in relation to the 
statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’”  Morales, 527 U.S. at 52 (quoting Broadrick, 413 
U.S. at 612-15); accord Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 
455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982); State v. Newman, 108 Idaho 5, 11, 696 P.2d 856, 862 (1985). 
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“As a general matter, the First Amendment means that government has no power 
to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”  
Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (brackets, internal 
quotation marks, and citations omitted).  It is well-settled, however, that not all forms of 
speech or expressive conduct are constitutionally protected.  Certain categories of speech, 
including “true threats”—i.e., “those statements where the speaker means to communicate 
a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular 
individual or group of individuals”—may be proscribed without offending the First 
Amendment.  E.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003).  Likewise, the 
Supreme Court has held that states may legitimately sanction expressive activities which 
amount to harmful conduct, rather than “pure speech,” if the conduct in question is 
otherwise within the state’s lawful power to proscribe:     
[F]acial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of 
practice and . . . its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the 
otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves 
from “pure speech” toward conduct and that conduct -- even if expressive 
-- falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect 
legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over 
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.  Although such laws, if too 
broadly worded, may deter protected speech to some unknown extent, 
there comes a point where that effect -- at best a prediction -- cannot, with 
confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a 
State from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within 
its power to proscribe. 
 
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615.  See also State v. Richards, 127 Idaho 31, 36, 896 P.2d 357, 
362 (1995) (“The strength of an overbreadth challenge diminishes where the statutory 
proscription is directed at behavior other than pure speech ….”).  Furthermore, “when 




sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can 
justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”  United States v. O’Brien, 
391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
 The first step in an overbreadth analysis is to determine whether the statute at 
issue regulates constitutionally protected conduct.  Manzanares, 152 Idaho at 423, 272 
P.3d at 395 (citing Korsen, 138 Idaho at 713, 69 P.3d at 133).  The statute at issue in this 
case, I.C. § 18-1353(1)(b), provides: “A person commits an offense if he … threatens 
harm to any public servant with the purpose to influence his decision, opinion, 
recommendation, vote or other exercise of discretion in a judicial or administrative 
proceeding.”  As used in the statute, the word “harm” means “loss, disadvantage or 
injury, including loss, disadvantage or injury to any other person or entity in whose 
welfare he is interested.”  I.C. § 18-1351(4).   Although this definition clearly includes 
within its ambit the types of “true threats” that are not afforded any constitutional 
protection, see Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60, the state acknowledges it is broad enough to 
potentially include within its sweep some protected speech and expression.  Such is not 
fatal to the validity of the statute, however.  Rather, to succeed in his facial overbreadth 
challenge, Sanchez must demonstrate that “the statute precludes a significant amount of 
that constitutionally protected conduct.”  Manzanares, 152 Idaho at 423, 272 P.3d at 395 
(citing Korsen, 138 Idaho at 713, 69 P.3d at 133).  Correct application of the law to the 
statute’s provisions shows that Sanchez has failed to carry this burden. 
 “‘[A] statute will not be invalidated for overbreadth merely because it is possible 
to imagine some unconstitutional applications.  Rather, there must be a realistic danger 
that the statute itself will significantly compromise recognized First Amendment 
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protections of parties not before the Court.’”  Manzanares, 152 Idaho at 424, 272 P.3d at 
396 (quoting Korsen, 138 Idaho at 714, 69 P.3d at 134).  To prevail on his overbreadth 
challenge, Sanchez must show both “‘from the text of [the statute] and from actual fact,’ 
that substantial overbreadth exists.”  Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 122 (2003) (quoting 
New York State Club Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 14 (1988)); accord 
State v. Doe, 148 Idaho 919, 925, 231 P.3d 1016, 1022 (2010).  “Overbreadth is not 
substantial if, despite the fact that some constitutionally protected conduct is proscribed, 
the statute covers a wide range of conduct that is easily identifiable and within the 
[state’s] power to prohibit.”  Doe, 148 Idaho at 925, 231 P.3d at 1022 (citing Korsen, 138 
Idaho at 714, 69 P.3d at 134).  “Where [a statute] proscribes protected speech only to 
some unknown extent, a court cannot justify invalidating the [statute].”  Id.  (citing 
Korsen, 138 Idaho at 714, 69 P.3d at 134). 
 Idaho Code § 18-1353(1)(b) clearly “covers a wide range of conduct that is easily 
identifiable and within the [state’s] power to prohibit.”  Id. (citation omitted).  Threats of 
violence, property damage, extortion, and blackmail are just a few examples of the types 
of harm that plainly fall within the statute’s legitimate sweep.  See I.C. § 18-1351(4) 
(defining “harm” as  “loss, disadvantage or injury”).  Indeed, there has never been any 
question that the conduct for which Sanchez was prosecuted in this case—threatening 
harm to Mr. Thomson and his family by way of a letter that made reference to, among 
other things, “[r]etribution,” “vengeance and wrath” (See State’s Exhibit 1 (spelling 
corrected))—fell outside the protections of the First Amendment.  Because the statute 
covers a wide array of conduct that is not constitutionally protected, whatever overbreadth 
may exist should be addressed on a case-by-case basis.  Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615-16. 
 
 10 
Without acknowledging the many legitimate applications of the I.C. § 18-
1353(1)(b) to conduct, including his own, that is not protected by the First Amendment, 
Sanchez claims the statute is substantially overbroad because it includes within its ambit 
constitutionally protected speech and expression.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.11-15.)  
Specifically, he argues that, because the statute does not specifically prohibit only “threats 
of unlawful harm” and instead defines harm as any “loss, disadvantage or injury,” the 
statute “prohibits all manner of protected speech, including core political speech.”  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.11-13 (emphasis in original).)  He cites a number of hypothetical 
examples in which he claims the statute might be unconstitutionally applied—e.g., 
prohibiting a criminal defendant from “threatening to file a bar complaint against a 
prosecutor” if he believes the charges against him are unfounded, prohibiting constituents 
concerned with a public servant’s upcoming administrative decision from threatening to 
not vote for or support the public servant in the next election (Appellant’s brief, p.13)—
and he claims, based upon these hypotheticals, that “there is a realistic danger that I.C.§ 
18-1353(1)(b) significantly compromises First Amendment protections” (Appellant’s 
brief, pp.13-15).  As found by the district court, however, “[w]hile such threats may 
conceivably be prohibited by the statute,” Sanchez has failed to demonstrate that any 
prohibition on protected speech is both real and substantial, especially as compared to the 
statute’s legitimate sweep.  (See R., p.214.) 
 The reasoning of State v. Stephenson, 950 P.2d 38 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998), which 
addressed an overbreadth challenge to Washington’s “intimidating a public servant” 
statute, and upon which the district court relied, is instructive.  Similar to Idaho’s 
threatening a public servant statute, the Washington statute criminalized the “use of a 
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threat” to “attempt[] to influence a public servant’s vote, opinion, decision, or other 
official action.”  Id. at 40 (quoting RCW 9A.76.180).  For purposes of the statute, the 
word “threat” was defined as “a direct or indirect communication with the intent … [t]o 
do any other act which is intended to harm substantially the person threatened or another 
with respect to his health, safety, business, financial condition, or personal relationships.”  
(quoting RCW 9A.04.110(25)(j)).  Stephenson challenged the constitutionality of the 
statute, arguing it “swe[pt] too broadly and could encompass even a threat to file and run 
against a public official to coerce a decision to the threatener’s liking.”  Id. at 43.  The 
Washington appellate court disagreed.  While the court acknowledged the statutory 
definition of threat “econcompasse[d] both protected and unprotected speech,” id. at 41, it 
ultimately found that any impermissible applications were not substantial compared to the 
statute’s legitimate reach, id. at 41-44. 
 In reaching its decision, the Stephenson Court observed that, on its face, the 
statute at issue served three “compelling” purposes: 
First, it protects public servants from threats of substantial harm based 
upon the discharge of their official duties.  Second, it protects the public’s 
interest in a fair and independent decision-making process consistent with 
the public interest and the law.  And third, by deterring the intimidation 
and threats that lead to corrupt decision making, it helps maintain public 
confidence in democratic institutions. 
 
Id. at 42 (citations, explanatory parenthetical, and footnote omitted). The court further 
reasoned that, “[b]y targeting only threats of ‘substantial harm’ that are designed to 
‘influence a public servant’s vote, opinion, decision, or other official action as a public 
servant,’ the challenged portion of the statute is narrowly tailored to address the overall 
problem it seeks to correct.”  Id.  “Although it [was] possible to conceive of 
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circumstances in which application of the statute would be unreasonable,” the court saw 
no “realistic danger that the statute [would] significantly compromise recognized First 
Amendment protections of parties not before the court” and, as such, concluded the 
statute was not unconstitutionally overbroad.  Id. at 43-44. 
 Other courts have similarly rejected overbreadth challenges to statutes like the one 
at issue in this case.  In People v. Janousek, 871 P.2d 1189 (Colo. 1994), for example, the 
Colorado Supreme Court upheld a statute that made it a crime to “attempt[] to influence 
any public servant by means of deceit or by threat of violence or economic reprisal.”  Id. 
at 1192 n.6 (quoting 18-8-306, 8B C.R.S. (1986)).   In so doing, the court found that the 
statute regulated proscribable conduct and that whatever “minimal burden” the statute 
“placed on a person’s speech interests [was] constitutionally insufficient to provoke the 
overbreadth doctrine.”  Id. at 1193-94.  
More recently, in State v. Spottedbear, 380 P.3d 810 (Mont. 2016), the Montana 
Supreme Court rejected Spottedbear’s assertion that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by not challenging as facially overbroad a statute that made it a crime to 
“threaten[] harm to any person … with the purpose to influence the person’s decision, 
opinion, recommendation, vote, or other exercise of discretion as a public servant, party 
official, or voter.”  Id. at 814 (citing MCA § 45-7-102(1)(a)(i)).  Like Sanchez, 
Spottedbear argued the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad because the definition of 
“harm” was expansive, the statute was “not limited to threats of unlawful harm,” and the 
statute “target[ed] the type of message that lies at the First Amendment’s heart.”  Id. at 
815 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Montana Supreme Court was unpersuaded 
and found, “when compared to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep, Spottedbear would 
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have a high hurdle to clear in showing how the statute adversely affects the rights of 
others in a real and substantial way.”  Id. at 816 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  The court further noted that the conduct for which Spottedbear had been 
prosecuted “plainly came within the statute’s legitimate sweep” and concluded, “[t]o the 
extent that the statute may reach constitutionally protected expression, any constitutional 
deficiencies not implicated by Spottedbear’s case can be addressed at that time.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
  Like the statutes at issue in Stephenson, Janousek, and Spottedbear, Idaho’s 
threatening a public servant statute, I.C. § 18-1353(1)(b), clearly addresses conduct that is 
within the government’s legitimate power to proscribe.  On its face, the statute seeks to 
safeguard the integrity of judicial and administrative proceedings by protecting public 
servants charged with making judicial and administrative decisions from threats of harm 
based upon the discharge of their official duties.  That Sanchez has conceived of 
hypothetical circumstances in which application of the statute might be unconstitutional 
is not a sufficient basis upon which to invalidate the statute.  Sanchez has failed to 
establish “a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compromise 
recognized First Amendment protections of parties not before the Court.”  Korsen, 138 
Idaho at 714, 69 P.3d at 134.  Accordingly, “whatever overbreadth may exist should be 
cured through case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which [the statute’s] 





Sanchez Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Admitting Evidence Of Mr. 
Thomson’s Reaction Upon Reading Sanchez’s Threatening Letter  
 
A. Introduction 
 The state prosecuted Sanchez for threatening a public servant based upon the 
letter Sanchez wrote and sent to Gem County Deputy Prosecutor Erick Thomson in 
September 2016.  (R., pp.224-25.)  Before introducing the letter into evidence at trial, the 
prosecutor established through Mr. Thomson’s testimony that, until he received the letter, 
there were only “three contexts” in which Mr. Thomson was familiar with Sanchez:  Mr. 
Thomson prosecuted Sanchez for a crime; he represent[ed] Gem County in a petition that 
was designed to take Mr. Sanchez’s children away from him”; and the Gem County 
Prosecutor’s Office represented the state in the post-conviction case in which Sanchez 
“was trying to undo the criminal conviction.”  (Tr., p.185, L.15 – p.194, L.17.) 
 After establishing “the extent of [Mr. Thomson’s] relationship with Mr. Sanchez” 
(Tr., p.194, Ls.16-17), the prosecutor handed Mr. Thomson State’s Exhibit 1, which Mr. 
Thomson identified as the letter he received from Sanchez while Sanchez was an inmate 
at the Idaho State Correctional Center and while Sanchez’s child protection and post-
conviction cases were still pending (Tr., p.197, L.9 – p.199, L.2).  The following 
exchange then took place: 
Q.  Did you read the letter when it came to you? 
 
A.  I did. 
 
Q.  What was your initial reaction to it? 
 




(Tr., p.199, Ls.3-6.)  Immediately following Mr. Thomson’s last answer, defense counsel 
interposed a “relevancy” objection, which the district court “[o]verruled.”  (Tr., p.199, 
Ls.7-8.)  The prosecutor then continued his questioning and, over a “leading” objection, 
Mr. Thomson testified that the reason he was “shocked and scared” was that, “[b]ased on 
[his] prosecution of Mr. Sanchez,” Sanchez “had shown several different instances of 
being very aggressive or violent.”  (Tr., p.199, L.10 – p.200, L.1.)  When asked why that 
gave him “alarm based on the letter itself,” Mr. Thomson responded, without objection, 
“Well, with my knowledge of Mr. Sanchez’s history and the threats contained in the 
letter, I was worried that perhaps me or my family was in danger.”  (Tr., p.200, Ls.2-10.) 
 On appeal, Sanchez argues the district court erred “by overruling his relevancy 
objection to Mr. Thomson’s reaction to his letter.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.16.)  According 
to Sanchez, “Mr. Thomson’s testimony—that his initial reaction to the letter was 
‘shocked’ and ‘scared’—was irrelevant” because Mr. Thomson’s “reaction does not have 
any tendency to make the existence of any fact of consequence more or less probable.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p.17 (citing I.R.E. 401).)  Sanchez is incorrect.  Mr. Thomson’s 
reaction to the letter, while not itself an element of the charged crime, was relevant to a 
the jury’s determination of whether the statements in the letter were in fact threats.  
Alternatively, even if the challenged testimony was not relevant, any error in its 
admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
Whether “evidence is relevant is a matter of law that is subject to free review.”  
State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 907, 354 P.3d 462, 469 (2014).  If this Court determines 
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that objected-to evidence was erroneously admitted, “the next issue is whether the error 
was harmless.”  State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 669, 227 P.3d 918, 923 (2010).  A 
harmless error “does not require reversal or a new trial.”  State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 
146, 176 P.3d 911, 918 (2007). 
 
C. Evidence of Mr. Thomson’s Reaction To Sanchez’s Letter Was Relevant To The 
Jury’s Determination Of Whether The Statements In The Letter Actually 
Constituted Threats 
 
“To be admissible, evidence must be relevant.”  State v. Koch, 157 Idaho 89, 100, 
334 P.3d 280, 291 (2014) (citing I.R.E. 401, 402).  “Evidence is relevant if it has ‘any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.’”  Id. 
(quoting I.R.E. 401).  “Whether a fact is material is determined by its relationship to the 
legal theories presented by the parties.”  Koch, 157 Idaho at 100-01, 334 P.3d at 291-92 
(citing State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443, 180 P.3d 476, 482 (2008)). 
To prove Sanchez was guilty of threatening a public servant, in violation of I.C. 
§ 18-1353(1)(b), the state was required to prove that Sanchez “threaten[ed] harm” to Mr. 
Thomson3 with the “purpose to influence [Mr. Thomson’s] decision, opinion, 
recommendation, vote or other exercise of discretion in a judicial or administrative 
proceeding.”  (See also R., p.259 (Jury Instruction No. 13 setting forth elements of 
crime).)  The state’s theory at trial was that the letter Sanchez wrote to Mr. Thomson in 
late September 2016 contained many statements that, considered in the context of Mr.
                                            
3 It was undisputed at trial that Mr. Thomson was a “public servant” as defined by I.C. 
§§ 18-1351(8), -1353(1)(b). 
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Thomson’s relationship with Sanchez and the status of Sanchez’s legal proceedings, 
constituted both explicit and implicit threats to harm Mr. Thomson and/or his family if 
Mr. Thomson did not accede to Sanchez’s demands that Mr. Thomson take action to 
“mitigate” what Sanchez claimed was his “unacceptable” continued imprisonment “for a 
crime [he] didn’t commit.”  (Compare State’s Exhibit 1 with Tr., p.329, L.3 – p.337, L.9, 
p.346, L.15 – p.348, L.7.)  Sanchez’s theory, on the other hand, was that Sanchez did not 
intend the statements in the letter to be threats, but that he was instead attempting to 
“negotiate” a resolution of his pending post-conviction case.  (Tr., p.337, L.16 – p.346, 
L.8.)  Whether the statements in the letter actually constituted threats of harm was, thus, 
an issue squarely before the jury; and, contrary to Sanchez’s assertions on appeal 
(Appellant’s brief, pp.15-19), evidence that Mr. Thomson was “shocked” and “scared” 
when he read the letter was directly relevant to that disputed issue. 
In cases in which the government must prove as an element of the charged crime 
that the defendant made a threat, “[w]hether a given [statement] constitutes a threat is an 
issue of fact for the trial jury.”  State v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing 
United States v. Lincoln, 589 F.2d 379, 381-82 (8th Cir.1979)), quoted in United States v. 
Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1492 (1st Cir. 1997).  Although Idaho’s appellate courts do not 
appear to have weighed in on the issue, other jurisdictions hold that the test for 
determining whether a particular statement is a threat is an objective one—i.e., “whether 
a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to 
whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of intent to harm or 
assault.”  State v. Cook, 947 A.2d 307, 315 (Conn. 2008); accord United States v. 
Hartbarger, 148 F.3d 777, 782-83 (7th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by United 
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States v. Colvin, 353 F.3d 569 (7th Cir. 2003); Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1491; United States v. 
Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by 
Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 
290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Manemann v. State, 878 S.W.2d 334, 337 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1994); see also United States v. Turner, 720 F.3d 411, 420 (2d Cir. 2013) (“This 
Circuit’s test for whether conduct amounts to a true threat is an objective one—namely, 
whether an ordinary, reasonable recipient who is familiar with the context of the 
[communication] would interpret it as a threat of injury.” (internal quotations and 
citations omitted, brackets in original)).   
In evaluating whether a statement is a threat, “the entire factual context, including 
the surrounding events and the reaction of the listeners, must be considered.”  People v. 
Uecker, 91 Cal. Rptr. 3d 355, 368 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (internal quotations and citation 
omitted, emphasis added); accord, Cook, 947 A.2d at 315-16; Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 
at 1265; Manemann, 878 S.W.2d at 337; People v. Stanley, 170 P.3d 782, 790 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 2007); Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1499-1500.  Although not determinative, “evidence of 
the effect of the threat upon its listener is relevant to what a reasonable person in the 
position of the speaker should have foreseen.”  Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1500; see also Malik, 
16 F.3d at 49 (“proof of the effect of the alleged threat upon the addressee is highly 
relevant”); State v. Schweppe, 237 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Minn. 1975) (“victim’s reaction to 
the threat was circumstantial evidence relevant to the element of intent of the defendant in 
making the threat”); State v. Olson, 552 N.W.2d 362, 365 (N.D. 1996) (same).  This is 
especially true in cases where the alleged threats are ambiguous; in such cases, “the 
recipients’ states of minds and their reactions” may serve to “remove ambiguity by 
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shedding light upon the context of the alleged threats.”  Malik, 16 F.3d at 50; see also 
Manemann, 878 S.W.2d at 337 (“Threats of physical harm need not be directly expressed, 
but may be contained in veiled statements nonetheless implying injury to the recipient 
when viewed in all the circumstances.” (citing State v. McGinnis, 243 N.W.2d 583 (Iowa 
1976)). 
Applying the foregoing principles in this case, it is clear that evidence of Mr. 
Thomson’s reaction to Sanchez’s letter was relevant in Sanchez’s trial for threatening 
harm to a public servant.  On its face, the letter contains a number of statements that, to 
an outside viewer, may not appear particularly threatening.  (State’s Exhibit 1.)  In fact, 
Sanchez began the letter by greeting Mr. Thomson by his first name and congratulating 
him on the new addition to his family.  (State’s Exhibit 1.)  As explained by Mr. 
Thomson, however, the only dealings he had ever had with Sanchez were in his 
professional capacity as a deputy prosecutor who prosecuted Sanchez for a crime and 
represented the state in an action to take Sanchez’s children away from him.  (Tr., p.185, 
L.15 – p.194, L.17; see also Tr., p.201, L.23 – p.203, L.1 (Mr. Thomson had “no idea” 
how Sanchez “would know about any changing dynamic to [Mr. Thomson’s] family”).)  
Evidence that Mr. Thomson was “shocked” and “scared” upon reading the letter is 
evidence that showed Mr. Thomson perceived the statements in the letter as threats based 
upon the context of his prior dealings with Sanchez, and that perception, in turn, was 
probative of what a reasonable person in Sanchez’s position would have foreseen.  See, 
e.g., Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1500 (recipient’s reaction to statement was “probative of 
whether one who makes such a statement might reasonably foresee that such a statement 
would be taken as a threat”).  Because evidence of Mr. Thomson’s reaction to the letter 
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was relevant to the disputed issue of whether the statements in the letter actually 
constituted threats of harm, Sanchez has failed to show any error in its admission. 
 
D. Any Error In The Admission Of The Challenged Evidence Was Harmless 
 
Even if the district court erred in admitting Mr. Thomson’s testimony regarding 
his initial reaction upon reading Sanchez’s letter, that error was harmless.  “To establish 
harmless error, the State must ‘prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained 
of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’”  State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 140, 334 
P.3d 806, 814 (2014) (quoting State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221, 245 P.3d 961, 973 
(2010)).  “‘In other words, the error is harmless if the Court finds that the result would be 
the same without the error.’”  State v. Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, ___, 408 P.3d 38, 44 
(2017) (quoting State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 598, 301 P.3d 242, 256 (2013)).  The 
result here would have been the same without the alleged error both because the specific 
testimony at issue had no prejudicial effect and because the evidence presented against 
Sanchez at trial was overwhelming. 
 First, any error in admitting the testimony at issue here was harmless because the 
testimony “had no prejudicial content.”  State v. Gerardo, 147 Idaho 22, 27, 205 P.3d 
671, 676 (Ct. App. 2009); see State v. Rothwell, 154 Idaho 125, 136, 294 P.3d 1137, 
1148 (Ct. App. 2013) (“In reviewing for harmless error, the court evaluates the potential 
prejudice from the inadmissible evidence in the context of the evidence presented at 
trial.”).  The objected-to testimony revealed to the jury only that Mr. Thomson was 
“shocked” and “scared” upon reading Sanchez’s letter.  (Tr., p.199, Ls.3-8.)  However, 
having been seated on a case in which the charge against Sanchez was identified as 
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“threats against public servants in official matters” (see, e.g., Tr., p.84, Ls.23-25), the jury 
was presumably already aware that Mr. Thomson, the public official to whom the letter at 
issue was addressed, perceived the letter as threatening.  Although Sanchez argues 
otherwise (Appellant’s brief, p.20), there is no indication that Mr. Thomson’s use of the 
words “shocked” and “scared” unfairly appealed to the jurors’ passions or sympathies.  
Compare Fulmer, 108 F.3d at 1499-1500 (holding victim’s characterization of message 
he interpreted as death threat as being “chilling” and “scary” “did not infect the 
proceedings with unfair prejudice”).  Nor is there any indication that the testimony 
“confuse[d] the jury to focus on Mr. Thomson’s reaction to the letter rather than Mr. 
Sanchez’s intent in writing the letter and its contents.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.20.)  In fact, 
the jury was specifically instructed that, to find Sanchez guilty, the state must have 
proved that Sanchez “threatened harm” to Mr. Thomson (R., p.259), meaning that 
Sanchez “express[ed] [an] intention, conveyed by word and/or act, to harm [Mr. 
Thomson] by the commission of an unlawful act” (R., p.260).  
 In an effort to persuade this Court that the state “cannot meet its burden” of 
demonstrating harmless error in the admission of Mr. Thomson’s objected-to testimony 
that he was “shocked” and “scared” upon reading Sanchez’s letter, Sanchez points to Mr. 
Thomson’s subsequent testimony that the reason he was “shocked” and “scared” was that 
Sanchez “had shown several different instances of being very aggressive or violent.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p.19; Tr., p.199, L.10 – p.200, L.10.)  According to Sanchez, “[t]his 
testimony was impermissible character evidence, not relevant for any purpose except to 
show Mr. Sanchez’s bad character and criminal propensity” (Appellant’s brief, p.19 
(citing, e.g., I.R.E. 404(b)) and would not “have been presented to the jury if the district 
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court had not admitted the evidence of Mr. Thomson’s reaction in the first place” 
(Appellant’s brief, p.20).  The glaring flaw in Sanchez’s argument is that Sanchez never 
challenged the admissibility of Mr. Thomson’s testimony regarding Sanchez’s history of 
being aggressive or violent, on I.R.E. 404(b) grounds or otherwise, below.  (See Tr., 
p.199, L.10 – p.200, L.10 (defense counsel objecting to prosecutor’s initial question 
regarding Mr. Thomson’s knowledge of Sanchez’s demeanor as “leading” but registering 
no objection to Mr. Thomson’s subsequent testimony that Sanchez had in the past shown 
instances of aggression and violence).)  That the testimony was offered and admitted as 
foundation for Mr. Thomson’s reaction to Sanchez’s letter does not show that the only 
testimony to which Sanchez objected—that Mr. Thomson was “shocked” and “scared”—
was itself prejudicial.  If Sanchez believed Mr. Thomson’s testimony regarding Sanchez’s 
history of aggression and violence was inadmissible character evidence under I.R.E. 
404(b), it was incumbent upon Sanchez to make that objection at trial.  See, e.g., State v. 
Cannady, 137 Idaho 67, 72, 44 P.3d 1122, 1127 (2002) (defendant’s challenge to 
admissibility of evidence under I.R.E. 404(b) not preserved for appeal where defendant 
failed to raise challenge in trial court).  Sanchez’s attempt to preemptively poke holes in 
the state’s harmless error argument by attacking the admissibility of evidence he never 
challenged in the trial court is merely an end-run around the requirement that parties to a 
case make timely objections and, as such, should be rejected. 
 Even if this Court entertains Sanchez’s request to consider Mr. Thomson’s 
unobjected-to testimony as part of its analysis in determining whether the objected-to 
reaction testimony contributed to the jury’s verdict, any error was still harmless because 
other evidence presented at trial overwhelmingly established Sanchez’s guilt.  See 
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Montgomery, 163 Idaho at ___, 408 P.3d at 44 (holding error harmless “[b]ased on the 
overwhelming evidence presented against Montgomery at trial”).  As noted above, Mr. 
Thomson testified that, before he received the letter, there were only three contexts in 
which he was familiar with Sanchez, all of which involved Mr. Thomson or Mr. 
Thomson’s office representing the state in adversarial proceedings against Sanchez.  (Tr., 
p.185, L.15 – p.194, L.17.)  Sanchez wrote the letter, and Mr. Thomson received it, while 
Sanchez was still incarcerated for the crime for which Mr. Thomson had prosecuted him 
and while Sanchez’s child protection and post-conviction cases were still pending.  (Tr., 
p.197, L.9 – p.199, L.2.)   
In the letter, Sanchez made a number of explicitly threatening statements and 
ultimatums—e.g., “I am about to put some things into motion that neither you or I can 
undo”; “I am willing to make a one time offer which must be acted upon very soon; 
otherwise I will be forced to do this the hard way”; My chess pieces are ready to move, 
and moving.  Parties have been contacted who await instructions”; “My God desires 
mercy over judgement, but make no mistake, when left no options, He will execute 
vengence and wrath”; “Me, sitting in prison, with my children in harm’s way, for a crime 
I didn’t commit, past my fixed time, is unacceptable.  I have four possible solutions to 
offer and all of them are more pleasant that what is about to happen.  Refuse, and what 
happens next is your doing.” (State’s Exhibit 1 (verbatim).)  Sanchez also made 
statements in the letter that, in the context of his dealings with Mr. Thomson, were 
implicitly threatening—e.g., referring to Mr. Thomson by his first name and 
congratulating him on the “new addition” to his family, despite having no personal 
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relationship with Mr. Thomson and no reason to know about Mr. Thomson’s changing 
family dynamic.  (State’s Exhibit 1; Tr., p.201, L.23 – p.203, L.1.) 
In an interview with law enforcement, Sanchez admitted that he authored the letter 
and sent it to Mr. Thomson with the objective of being released from prison and reunited 
with his family.  (Tr., p.228, L.17 – p.229, L.6, p.230, Ls.2-10.)  He also told law 
enforcement he was seeking an acquittal and money damages of $500 per day.  (State’s 
Exhibit 9 at 5:10 – 6:33; Tr., p.316, L.15 – p.320, L.4.)  He made similar admissions 
while testifying at trial, confirming that he wrote the letter to Mr. Thomson (Tr., p.277, 
Ls.17-24, p.289, Ls.1-3), that at the time he did so he was incarcerated but believed he 
should have been on parole (Tr., p.291, Ls.23-25), and that his goal was “to motivate or 
incentivize Mr. Thomson to act in a way that to [sic] benefit [Sanchez] in a judicial or 
administrative proceeding” (Tr., p.309, L.18 – p.310, L.6).  
 The foregoing evidence, including Sanchez’s admissions and the content of the 
letter itself, overwhelmingly established that Sanchez threatened harm to Mr. Thomson 
with the purpose of influencing Mr. Thomson’s decision or recommendation in a judicial 
or administrative proceeding.  Considering the strength of this evidence, there is no 
reasonable possibility that Mr. Thomson’s testimony that he was “shocked” and “scared” 
upon reading the letter (or even his subsequent testimony that Sanchez had a history of 
being aggressive and violent) contributed to the jury’s verdict.  Any error in the admission 







Sanchez Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting 




 Sanchez wrote the letter at issue in this case while incarcerated in relation to a 
felony injury to child case in which Mr. Thomson was the prosecutor.  Before trial, 
Sanchez moved for an order prohibiting the state from presenting evidence that the crime 
of conviction was injury to a child, arguing the nature of the crime was irrelevant, 
inadmissible I.R.E. 404(b) evidence, and unfairly prejudicial under I.R.E. 403.  (Tr., p.41, 
L.24 – p.42, L.3, p.43, Ls.10-21, p.48, L.22 – p.60, L.13, p.62, L.20 – p.71, L.23.)  The 
district court denied Sanchez’s motion, finding the fact that Sanchez had been convicted 
of felony injury to a child was “not true 404(b) evidence” (Tr., p.58, Ls.13-20, p.64, 
Ls.20-23, p.71, Ls.2-3; see also p.243, L.1 – p.244, L.3) and, in any event, it was evidence 
relevant to Sanchez’s “motive and intent”  (Tr., p.58, L.21 – p.59, L.6, p.71, Ls.10-15; see 
also, p.243, Ls.10-19).  The court also found the probative value of the evidence was not 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  (Tr., p.59, Ls.6-14, p.71, 
Ls.15-23; see also p.243, Ls.18-24.)  The court therefore permitted the state to introduce 
at trial the first page of the judgment of conviction that showed Sanchez had been 
convicted of felony injury to a child.  (Tr., p.189, L.4 – p.190, L.17; State’s Exhibit 3.) 
 Sanchez challenges the court’s evidentiary ruling, arguing as he did below that 
“evidence of his prior conviction was not relevant for any proper purpose” and, “even if 
minimally relevant, the danger of unfair prejudice to Mr. Sanchez substantially 
outweighed the evidence’s probative value.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.20-21.)  Sanchez’s 
arguments fail.  Correct application of the law to the facts of this case supports the trial 
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court’s determination that the nature of charge for which Mr. Thomson prosecuted 
Sanchez—injury to a child—was relevant to Sanchez’s motive and intent to threaten Mr. 
Thomson.  A review of the record and the applicable law also shows the trial court 
correctly exercised its discretion in concluding the probative value of the challenged 
evidence was not substantially outweighed by its danger of unfair prejudice, particularly 
since the trial court mitigated any potentially prejudicial effect by giving a limiting 
instruction.  Alternatively, even if the court erred by admitting the evidence, any such 
error was harmless.     
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
Relevance is a question of law reviewed de novo, while balancing under I.R.E. 
403 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 190, 254 P.3d 
77, 91 (Ct. App. 2011).  Rulings under I.R.E. 404(b) are also reviewed under a bifurcated 
standard: whether the evidence is admissible for a purpose other than propensity is given 
free review while the determination of whether the probative value of the evidence is 
substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion.  State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009).  In reviewing a 
trial court’s discretionary decision, this Court evaluates whether the trial court correctly 
perceived the decision as discretionary, whether the trial court acted within the 
boundaries of its discretion and consistent with legal standards, and whether the court 




C. The Fact That Sanchez Was Convicted Of Injury To A Child In The Case 
Prosecuted By Mr. Thomson Was Relevant To The Disputed Issues Of Sanchez’s 
Motive And Intent To Threaten Mr. Thomson 
 
To be admissible, evidence must be relevant.  I.R.E. 401, 402.  Evidence that 
tends to prove the existence of a fact of consequence in the case, and has any tendency to 
make the existence of that fact more probable than it would be without the evidence, is 
relevant.  State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 544, 547, 768 P.2d 807, 810 (Ct. App. 1989). 
“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove a 
defendant’s criminal propensity.  However, such evidence may be admissible for a 
purpose other than that prohibited by I.R.E. 404(b).”  State v. Truman, 150 Idaho 714, 
249 P.3d 1169 (Ct. App. 2011) (citations omitted); see also State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 
52, 205 P.3d 1185, 1188 (2009) (“Evidence of uncharged misconduct must be relevant to 
a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity.” 
(citations omitted)).  Under I.R.E. 404(b), evidence of prior wrongs or acts may be 
admitted to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident.  I.R.E. 404(b); State v. Phillips, 123 Idaho 178, 845 P.2d 
1211 (1993).  Evidence runs afoul of Rule 404(b) only “if its probative value is entirely 
dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate the defendant’s propensity to engage in such 
behavior.”  State v. Folk, 157 Idaho 869, 876, 341 P.3d 586, 593 (Ct. App. 2014) (citing 
Grist, 147 Idaho at 54, 205 P.3d at 1190; State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459, 463, 235 P.3d 
409, 413 (Ct. App. 2010)).  “Of course, evidence of a prior crime, wrong or act may 
implicate a person’s character while also being relevant and admissible for some 
permissible purpose, such as those listed in the rule.”  Id. (citing State v. Pepcorn, 152 
Idaho 678, 688-89, 273 P.3d 1271, 1281-82 (2012)). 
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In this case, it is undisputed that Sanchez was in fact convicted of felony injury to 
a child as a result of Mr. Thomson’s prosecution of him.  (See State’s Exhibit 3.)  Thus, 
in determining whether evidence that Sanchez had been convicted of injury to a child was 
admissible, the first question before the district court was whether the nature of that 
conviction was “relevant to a material disputed issue concerning the crime charged 
[threatening a public servant], other than propensity.”  Grist, 147 Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 
1188 (citations omitted).  The district court concluded that it was, finding as an initial 
matter that, under the facts of this case, the nature of Sanchez’s prior conviction was not 
“true 404(b) evidence” because it was “intrinsic to the facts of the case.”  (Tr., p.58, 
Ls.13-20, p.64, Ls.20-23, p.71, Ls.2-3; see also Tr., p.243, L.1 – p.244, L.3 (explaining 
State’s Exhibit 3 was admitted, in part, because it was “proof of the underlying 
proceeding” that was the predicate to the parole proceeding about which Sanchez was 
charged with seeking to influence Mr. Thomson’s recommendation).)  The court further 
found that, even if I.R.E. 404(b) applied, the challenged evidence was relevant for non-
propensity purposes—namely, to show that Sanchez had both the motive and the intent to 
threaten Mr. Thomas in order to influence Mr. Thomas’ decision or recommendation in a 
judicial or administrative proceeding.  (Tr., p.58, L.21 – p.59, L.6, p.71, Ls.10-15; see 
also, p.243, Ls.10-19.)  Contrary to Sanchez’s assertions, correct application of the law to 
the facts of this case supports the district court’s rulings. 
In order to prove Sanchez was guilty of threatening a public official as alleged in 
the charging document, the state was required to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that Sanchez “threaten[ed] harm” to Mr. Thomson “by sending [him] a threatening letter” 
with the “purpose to influence his decision, opinion, recommendation (vote) or other 
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exercise of discretion in … a pending child protection proceeding and/or future parole 
hearings.”  (R., pp.224-25; see also R., p.259 (elements instruction)); compare I.C. § 18-
1353(1)(b).  As argued by the prosecutor and found by the district court, Sanchez’s felony 
injury to a child conviction was directly relevant to the charged crime because that 
conviction led to Sanchez’s imprisonment and was the entire reason the child protection 
and parole proceedings at issue existed.  (Tr., p.54, L.20 – p.57, L.8, p.58, L.13 – p.60, 
L.6, p.243, Ls.1-9.)  Sanchez apparently recognized as much, as he conceded below that 
the state could present evidence that he was in prison after having been found guilty in a 
criminal case in which Mr. Thomson was the prosecutor, that he was “fighting that case,” 
and that there was “a child protection case that derived from that.”  (Tr., p.54, Ls.5-10; 
Appellant’s brief, p.27 (Sanchez does not contest admissibility of evidence indicating his 
past felony criminal conviction as a result of Mr. Thomson’s prosecution).)  Under the 
circumstances, evidence that the crime of conviction was injury to a child had no more 
tendency to indict Sanchez’s character than did the evidence, which Sanchez 
acknowledges was admissible, that Sanchez had been imprisoned as a result of 
committing a serious criminal offense.  Because the fact and nature of Sanchez’s prior 
conviction was not improper character evidence, but was instead necessary to establish 
one of the elements of the charged offense, the district court correctly concluded the 
evidence was relevant and not subject to exclusion under I.R.E. 404(b). 
Sanchez argues otherwise, claiming that, in finding that evidence of the nature of 
Sanchez’s prior felony conviction was “not true 404(b) evidence,” the district court 
engaged in an improper res gestae analysis.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.24-25.)  The state 
acknowledges the Idaho Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Kralovec, 161 Idaho 569, 
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574, 388 P.3d 583, 588 (2017), which rejected res gestae as a basis for admitting 
evidence that otherwise does not comply with the standards for admission set forth in the 
Idaho Rules of Evidence.  Contrary to Sanchez’s assertions, however, it is not clear that 
the district court applied a res gestae standard in ruling that the evidence in question did 
not fall within the scope of I.R.E. 404(b).  Although the court variously stated that the 
challenged evidence was “interrelated with” and “intrinsic to the facts of the case” being 
tried (Tr., p.58, Ls.18-20, p.64, Ls.20-23), it later clarified that it had admitted the 
evidence “because it was proof of the underlying proceeding” (Tr., p.243, Ls.1-9).  
Because, for the reasons explained above, that analysis was correct, Sanchez has failed to 
show any error in the court’s initial ruling that the challenged evidence did not implicate 
I.R.E. 404(b). 
Even if the evidence of the nature of Sanchez’s prior conviction was subject to an 
I.R.E. 404(b) analysis, the district court conducted that analysis and correctly determined 
the evidence was relevant to the issues of Sanchez’s motive and intent.  “Motive is 
generally defined as that which leads or tempts the mind to indulge in a particular act.”  
State v. Stevens, 93 Idaho 48, 53, 454 P.2d 945, 950 (1969), quoted in State v. Folk, 157 
Idaho 869, 877, 341 P.3d 586, 594 (Ct. App. 2014).  Intent, on the other hand, “is the 
purpose to use a particular means to effect a certain result.”  Id.  “Evidence of motive is 
relevant when the existence of a motive is a circumstance tending to make it more 
probable that the person in question did the act.”  State v. Russo, 157 Idaho 299, 308, 336 
P.3d 232, 241 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Similarly, in cases in which 
intent is a disputed element, “[e]vidence of prior bad acts may be relevant to prove the 
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intent element of the charged offense.”  Folk, 157 Idaho at 879, 341 P.3d at 596  (citation 
omitted). 
In this case, Sanchez’s motive and intent in writing the letter to Mr. Thomson 
were both directly at issue.  While it was undisputed that Sanchez wrote the letter, the 
state was still required to prove that the statements in the letter were threats, made for the 
purpose of influencing Mr. Thomson’s decision or recommendation in Sanchez’s child 
protection or parole proceedings.  As explained in Section II.C., supra, Sanchez denied 
having intended to threaten Mr. Thomson, claiming instead that the statements he made 
in the letter were merely his attempt to “negotiate” a resolution to his post-conviction 
case.  (Tr., p.337, L.16 – p.346, L.8.)  The state’s theory, however, was that Sanchez 
intended the statements in the letter as threats of harm to Mr. Thomson and his family so 
that Mr. Thomson would be incentivized by fear to act in a way that would benefit 
Sanchez in his child protection and/or parole proceedings.  (See, e.g., Tr., p.309, L.23 – 
p.310, L.6.)  Evidence that Sanchez was convicted of injury to a child in the case 
prosecuted by Mr. Thomson tended to make it more probable that Sanchez had a motive 
to threaten harm to Mr. Thomson and his family, that he intended the statements about 
Mr. Thomson and his family as threats, and that he made the threats in order to influence 
Mr. Thomson to take action to assist in restoring Sanchez’s freedom and reuniting him 
with his own children, who had been removed from his care as a result of his injury to a 
child conviction.  Compare, State v. Fischer, 354 N.W.2d 29, 32-33 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1984) (evidence of defendant’s prior assaultive relationship with victim was relevant to 
show defendant’s intent and motive for making terroristic threats).   Because the evidence 
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was relevant to Sanchez’s motive and intent in making the alleged threats, the district 
court correctly determined its admission did not run afoul of I.R.E. 404(b).   
As he did below, Sanchez argues on appeal that evidence of his injury to a child 
conviction was not relevant to demonstrate his motive but was instead “character 
evidence, plain and simple,” with the only possible inference being that “Sanchez harmed 
a child so he is more likely to threaten harm to another person.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.26.)    
Sanchez is incorrect.  First, for the reasons set forth above, evidence that Sanchez had 
been convicted of injury to a child in the case prosecuted by Mr. Thomson was relevant to 
demonstrate both why Sanchez may have been inclined to threaten harm to Mr. Thomson 
and that he intended by the statements in his letter to do so.  That the state’s charging 
document alleged Sanchez’s purpose in threating harm to Mr. Thomson was to influence 
Mr. Thomson’s decision in a child protection or parole proceeding does not, as suggested 
by Sanchez, mean that Sanchez’s motive was not at issue in the case.  (See Appellant’s 
brief, p.27.)  Again, the state was required to prove that the statements Sanchez made in 
the letter were actually threats.  Whether Sanchez had a reason to threaten Mr. Thomson 
was directly relevant to the jury’s determination of that issue. 
Second, because evidence of the injury to a child conviction was relevant to the 
issues of Sanchez’s motive and intent in making the alleged threats, Sanchez’s claim that 
the evidence “only shows his propensity or proclivity to (threaten) harm” (Appellant’s 
brief, p.26) is necessarily without merit.  Like the district court, the state recognizes that, 
absent a limiting instruction, there was a potential danger that the challenged evidence 
could implicate Sanchez’s character.  (See Tr., p.59, Ls.6-14.)  However, because the 
evidence was also relevant for a permissible purpose—to show Sanchez’s motive and 
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intent—its admission was not prohibited by I.R.E. 404(b).  See, e.g., Grist, 147 Idaho at 
54, 205 P.3d at 1190 (evidence is inadmissible under I.R.E. 404(b) only “when its 
probative value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate the defendant’s 
propensity to engage in such behavior” (emphasis added)); Folk, 157 Idaho at 876, 341 
P.3d at 593 (“evidence of a prior crime, wrong or act may implicate a person’s character 
while also being relevant and admissible for some permissible purpose, such as those 
listed in the rule”).  Rather, as found by the district court, any potential that the jury might 
consider the evidence for an improper purpose could be, and ultimately was, addressed 
“with proper instructions.”  (See Tr., p.59, Ls.6-14, p.243, Ls.18-24; R., p.266 (Jury 
Instruction No. 20 limiting purposes for which jury could consider evidence of prior 
acts).)  Sanchez has failed to show error in the district court’s determination that evidence 
of his injury to a child conviction was admissible under I.R.E. 404(b). 
Sanchez has also failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it 
concluded that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice.  Pursuant to I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence may be excluded 
if, in the district court’s discretion, the danger of unfair prejudice—which is the tendency 
to suggest a decision on an improper basis—substantially outweighs the probative value 
of the evidence.  State v. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471, 248 P.3d 720, 722 (2010); State v. 
Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 908 (Ct. App. 1994); State v. Nichols, 124 
Idaho 651, 656, 862 P.2d 343, 348 (Ct. App. 1993).   
Rule 403 does not offer protection against evidence that is merely prejudicial in 
the sense of being detrimental to a party’s case.  See State v. Leavitt, 116 Idaho 285, 290, 
775 P.2d 599, 604 (1989) (“Certainly that evidence was prejudicial to the defendant, 
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however, almost all evidence in a criminal trial is demonstrably admitted to prove the 
case of the state, and thus results in prejudice to a defendant.”).  Rather, the rule protects 
only against evidence that is unfairly prejudicial, that is, evidence that tends to suggest a 
decision on an improper basis.  Floyd, 125 Idaho at 654, 873 P.2d at 908. As previously 
explained by the Idaho Supreme Court: “Under the rule, the evidence is only excluded if 
the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  The 
rule suggests a strong preference for admissibility of relevant evidence.”  State v. Martin, 
118 Idaho 334, 340 n.3, 796 P.2d 1007, 1013 n.3 (1990) (emphasis in original).   
The district court concluded the evidence of Sanchez’s injury to a child conviction 
was relevant “for the jury to understand what may have motivated [Sanchez] to reach out 
and try to influence” Mr. Thomson, explaining:   
What he’s facing, a conviction for injury to child, a child protection 
proceeding, the fact that his sentence was imposed, these are all things that 
go to what [Sanchez] is facing, the seriousness of it, and his motivation to 
seek to influence the prosecutor and are all effectively backdrop to the 
case. 
 
(Tr., p.58, L.21 – p.59, L.6; see also Tr., p.71, Ls.10-15 (court finding fact Sanchez was 
convicted of injury to a child “goes to motive and intent”), p.243, Ls.1-17 (court finding 
challenged evidence was relevant “for motive and the reason why [Sanchez] would write 
the letter, in addition to wanting out [of prison], it’s the context of why it would be 
potentially considered a threat”).)  The only unfair prejudice identified by Sanchez, both 
below and on appeal, was the possibility the jury would infer from the nature of the 
conviction that Sanchez was a bad person and would convict him on that basis.  (Tr., 
p.52, L.15 – p.54, L.16; Appellant’s brief, pp.27-28.) The district court, however, 
specifically recognized the potential for that “collateral” prejudicial effect of the evidence 
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(see Tr., p.59, L.6-14, p.71, Ls.15-23, p.243, Ls.19-24); and ameliorated it by instructing 
the jury that it was not to consider the evidence “to prove the defendant’s character or that 
the defendant has a disposition to commit crimes,” but was to consider it “only for the 
limited purpose of proving the defendant’s motive and/or to demonstrate the underlying 
facts and circumstances giving rise to the charge and/or to prove the existence and nature 
of the proceedings from which the state claims the defendant was seeking relief” (R., 
p.266 (Jury Instruction No. 20)). 
Assuming, as this Court must, that the jury followed the court’s instruction, see, 
e.g., Pepcorn, 152 Idaho at 690, 273 P.3d at 1283, there is no risk that the jury considered 
the evidence for anything other than its proper purpose.  Sanchez has failed to show the 
trial court abused its discretion in concluding that, with an appropriate limiting 
instruction, the risk of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value 
of the evidence to prove Sanchez’s motive and intent in writing the threatening letter.  
See State v. Marks, 156 Idaho 559, 328 P.3d 539 (Ct. App. 2014) (although evidence of 
other bad acts “carried some risk that the jury would use it for an improper purpose,” trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that, with a limiting instruction, risk of 
unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh probative value of evidence for 
permissible purpose).   
 
D. Even If The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Admitting Evidence Of 
Sanchez’s Injury To A Child Conviction, The Error Was Harmless 
 
Even when the trial court has abused its discretion, such “abuse of discretion may 
be deemed harmless if a substantial right is not affected.  In the case of an incorrect ruling 
regarding evidence, this Court will grant relief on appeal only if the error affects a 
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substantial right of one of the parties.”  State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363, 247 
P.3d 582, 590 (2010); accord I.R.E. 103(a) (“Error may not be predicated upon a ruling 
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected ….”); 
I.C.R. 52 (“Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial 
rights shall be disregarded.”).  “An error is harmless if a reviewing court can find beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same result without the 
admission of the challenged evidence.”  State v. Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 887, 119 
P.3d 653, 662 (Ct. App. 2005). 
Even if the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that Sanchez 
was convicted of injury to a child, the error did not affect Sanchez’s substantial rights.  
First, the jury was aware through evidence Sanchez agreed was admissible that Sanchez 
was convicted of a felony that was serious enough to result in his incarceration and the 
removal of his children from his custody.  (Tr., p.54, Ls.5-10, p.185, L.15 – p.189, L.2, 
p.194, Ls.9-17.)  There is no reasonable possibility that the jury found the fact that 
Sanchez’s conviction was for injury to a child any more damning than the fact of the 
serious felony conviction itself.  Second, the court’s limiting instruction directing the jury 
that it was not to consider the challenged evidence as proof of Sanchez’s character must 
be presumed to have eliminated the possibility that the jury might do so. See, e.g., 
Pepcorn, 152 Idaho at 690, 273 P.3d at 1283.  Finally, the jury would have reached same 
result even without the challenged evidence because, for the reasons set forth in Section 
II.D., supra, the evidence against Sanchez was overwhelming.  See, e.g., Montgomery, 
163 Idaho at ___, 408 P.3d at 44.  If there was error it was harmless beyond a reasonable 




Sanchez Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting 




 Sanchez argues the district court erred by overruling his relevancy objection to 
State’s Exhibit 4, which Mr. Thomson identified as the face-sheet of the document that 
initiated Sanchez’s post-conviction proceeding to challenge his conviction in the injury to 
a child case. (Tr., p.189, L.21 – p.190, L.17; see also Tr., p.65, Ls.14-19 (objecting to 
State’s Exhibit 4 on relevancy grounds).)  According to Sanchez, the document should 
not have been admitted because “[t]he existence of the post-conviction proceedings was 
immaterial to the charged offense.”  (Appellant’s brief, pp.29-31.)  Sanchez is incorrect.  
Application of the law to the facts supports the district court’s conclusion that evidence of 
Sanchez’s post-conviction proceedings was relevant to the disputed issue of Sanchez’s 
motivation and intent to threaten Mr. Thomson.  Even if the evidence was not relevant, a 
review of the record shows its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
Whether “evidence is relevant is a matter of law that is subject to free review.”  
State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 907, 354 P.3d 462, 469 (2014).   
 
C. Evidence Of Sanchez’s Post-Conviction Proceeding Was Relevant To His 
Motivation And Intent To Threaten Mr. Thomson 
 
“To be admissible, evidence must be relevant.”  State v. Koch, 157 Idaho 89, 100, 
334 P.3d 280, 291 (2014) (citing I.R.E. 401, 402).  “Evidence is relevant if it has ‘any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
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the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.’”  Id. 
(quoting I.R.E. 401).  “Whether a fact is material is determined by its relationship to the 
legal theories presented by the parties.”  Koch, 157 Idaho at 100-01, 334 P.3d at 291-92 
(citing State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443, 180 P.3d 476, 482 (2008)).  
As explained in prior sections of this brief, the parties’ theories in this case 
centered on whether Sanchez intended the statements he made in the letter to Mr. 
Thomson as threats of harm.  Like the judgment of conviction in the injury to a child 
case, the document showing Sanchez had initiated a post-conviction proceeding to 
challenge his underlying felony conviction that resulted in his imprisonment and the 
removal of his children from his custody was relevant to show the context in which 
Sanchez wrote the letter and prove his motivation and intent to threaten Mr. Thomson.  
See Section III.C., supra.  It was also relevant to Sanchez’s own theory of the case—that 
he wrote the letter in an attempt to negotiate a resolution to his pending post-conviction 
case.  (See Tr., p.337, L.16 – p.346, L.8.)   In light of the fact that Sanchez himself relied 
on the evidence of his pending post-conviction proceeding to attempt to rebut the state’s 
theory that he intended to threaten Mr. Thomson, his claims below and on appeal that the 
evidence was not relevant are without merit.    
 
D. Any Error In Admission Of The Evidence Was Harmless 
 
 Even if the district court erred in admitting evidence of Sanchez’s post-conviction 
proceeding, any such error is harmless because it did not contribute to the jury’s verdict.  
I.C.R. 52; I.R.E. 103; State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221, 245 P.3d 961, 973 (2010)). 
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First, Sanchez’s claim that the evidence “painted [him] in a negative light as an 
overly litigious individual” and “prejudiced the jury against [him] for exercising his right 
to post-conviction relief” (Appellant’s brief, p.31) is without any basis in the record.  Nor 
is it a realistic possibility that such was the case in light of Mr. Thomson’s testimony (1) 
describing a post-conviction action as “sort of like an appeal” to “challenge … legally, 
certain aspects of” a conviction, and (2) indicating that, at the time Sanchez wrote the 
letter at issue, “it would have been appropriate for there to be a post conviction case.”  
(Tr., p.187, L.16 – p.188, L.5.)   
Second, contrary to Sanchez’s assertions, there is no reasonable possibility that 
evidence of Sanchez’s post-conviction proceeding “misled the jury and confused the 
issues by indicating that the jury could find [him] guilty of intending to influence a 
different proceeding that the two proceedings alleged in the charging document.”  
(Appellant’s brief, p.31.)  The jury was specifically instructed that, to find Sanchez guilty, 
the state must have proved he threatened harm to Mr. Thomson for the purpose of 
influencing Mr. Thomson’s decision or recommendation in Sanchez’s “pending child 
protection proceeding and/or future parole hearing.”  (R., p.259 (Jury Instruction No. 
13).)  Because the jury must be presumed to have followed this instruction, see, e.g., 
Pepcorn, 152 Idaho at 690, 273 P.3d at 1283, there is no risk the jury found Sanchez 
guilty based upon an attempt to influence his post-conviction proceeding. 
Finally, the jury would have reached the same result even without the challenged 
evidence because, for the reasons set forth in Section II.D., supra, the evidence against 
Sanchez was overwhelming.  See, e.g., Montgomery, 163 Idaho at ___, 408 P.3d at 44.  If 




Sanchez Has Failed To Show The Cumulative Error Doctrine Applies, Much Less 
That It Requires Reversal Of His Conviction 
 
Sanchez has failed to show that the cumulative error doctrine applies to his case.  
“Under the cumulative errors doctrine, an accumulation of irregularities, each of which 
might be harmless in itself, may in the aggregate reveal the absence of a fair trial in 
contravention of the defendant’s right to due process.”  State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 
723, 215 P.3d 414, 443 (2009).  The cumulative error doctrine may apply only if there is 
more than one error, excluding “errors not objected to at trial that are not deemed 
fundamental.”  Id.  Sanchez has failed to show any error in the district court’s handling of 
his trial and has thus failed to establish the requisite number of errors for the cumulative 
error doctrine to apply. 
 Even if Sanchez could show a sufficient number of errors to apply the cumulative 
error doctrine, it would not require a reversal of his conviction.  “The presence of errors 
... does not by itself require the reversal of a conviction, since under due process a 
defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not an error-free trial.”  State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 
873, 332 P.3d 767, 785 (2014).  Any cumulative effect from the trial errors Sanchez 
alleges did not affect the verdict or deprive Sanchez of a fair trial—especially in light of 
the evidence presented against Sanchez.  See Section II.D., supra; see also State v. 
Rothwell, 154 Idaho 125, 136-38, 294 P.3d 1137, 1148-50 (Ct. App. 2013) (finding no 






 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment. 
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